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Abstract: In this paper, a methodology for limnimeter and rain-gauge fault detection and isolation (FDI) 13 
in sewer networks is presented. The proposed model based FDI approach uses interval parity equations 14 
for fault detection in order to enhance robustness against modelling errors and noise. They both are 15 
assumed unknown but bounded, following the so-called interval (or set-membership) approach. On the 16 
other hand, fault isolation relies on an algorithm that reasons using several fault signature matrices that 17 
store additional information to the typical binary one used in standard FDI approaches. More precisely, 18 
the considered fault signature matrices contain information about residual fault sign/sensitivity and 19 
time/order of activation. The paper also proposes an identification procedure to obtain the interval models 20 
used in fault detection that delivers the nominal model plus parameter uncertainty is proposed.  To 21 
exemplify the proposed FDI methodology, a case study based on the Barcelona sewer network is used.  22 
Keywords: Fault detection, fault isolation, sewer networks, robust methods. 23 
 24 
1. INTRODUCTION 25 
 26 
Sewer networks are complex large-scale systems which require highly sophisticated supervisory-control systems to ensure 27 
that high performance can be achieved and maintained under adverse operating conditions. Most cities around the world have 28 
sewage systems that combine sanitary and storm water flows within the same network. This is why these networks are known 29 
as Combined Sewage Systems (CSS). During rain storms, wastewater flows can easily overload these CSS, thereby causing 30 
operators to dump the excess of water into the nearest receiver environment (rivers, streams or sea). This discharge to the 31 
environment, known as Combined Sewage Overflow (CSO), contains biological and chemical contaminants creating a major 32 
environmental and public health hazard. Environmental protection agencies have started forcing municipalities to find 33 
solutions in order to avoid those CSO events. A possible solution to the CSO problem would be to enhance existing sewer 34 
infrastructure by increasing the capacity of the wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) and by building new underground 35 
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detention tanks. But, in order to take profit of these expensive infrastructures, a highly sophisticated real-time control (RTC) 36 
scheme is also necessary which ensures that high performance can be achieved and maintained under adverse meteorological 37 
conditions (Schütze, 2004) (Marinaki, 2005). The advantage of RTC applied to sewer networks has been demonstrated by an 38 
important number of researchers during the last decades. Comprehensive reviews that include a discussion of some existing 39 
implementations are given by (Schilling, 1996) (Schütze, 2004) and cited references therein, while practical issues are 40 
discussed by (Schütze, 2002), among other.  The RTC scheme in sewage systems might be local or global. When local control 41 
is applied, flow regulation devices use only measurements taken at their specific locations. While this control structure is 42 
applicable in many simple cases, in a big city, with a strongly interconnected sewer network and a complex infrastructure of 43 
sensors and actuators, it may not be the most efficient alternative. Conversely, a global control strategy, which computes 44 
control actions taking into account real-time measurements all through the network, is likely the best way to use the 45 
infrastructure capacity and all the available sensor information. The multivariable and large-scale nature of sewer networks has 46 
lead to the use of some variants of Model Predictive Control (MPC), as global control strategy (Gelormino, 1994)(Cembrano, 47 
2004)(Pleau, 2005) (Marinaki 2005) (Ocampo-Martínez, 2008).  48 
 49 
The global RTC need to operate in adverse meteorological conditions involves, with a high probability, sensor and actuator 50 
malfunctions (faults). This problem calls for the use of an on-line fault detection and isolation (FDI) system  able to detect 51 
such faults and correct them (if possible) by activating fault tolerance mechanisms, as the use of soft sensors or using the 52 
embedded tolerance of the MPC controller, that avoids that the global RTC  should be stopped every time that a fault appears. 53 
According to (Schütze, 2004), this is one of the main reasons why today there is a small number of global RTC operating in the 54 
world. This difficulty has also been assessed by the author when implementing the global RTC in the Barcelona sewer network 55 
(Cembrano, 2004). This has motivated the research presented in this paper. 56 
  57 
In the literature, FDI in sewer networks has already been addressed using Takagi-Sugeno multi-models in the case of rain-58 
gauges (Giuliani, 1997) and in the case of limnimeters (Boukhris 1997; 2001). Fault detection is based on checking the residual 59 
against a threshold that has been derived either from statistical or empirical approaches. The use of Kalman filters and Wald 60 
sequential test has been proposed by (Piatyszek et al., 2000) as means of detecting limnimeter faults in sewer networks. In all 61 
these approaches, a simplified deterministic model of rainfall-runoff transformation is considered.  62 
 63 
In the present paper, a simplified model based on the virtual tank modelling approach proposed in (Cembrano, 2004) is used  to 64 
model the rainfall-runoff transformation. This conceptual modelling approach based on establishing mass balances in the sewer 65 
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network catchments avoids the complexity of the physical oriented models based on Saint-Venant equations that are not 66 
adequate to be used on-line.  To consider the uncertainty in the sewer modelling due to the use of this conceptual approach, a 67 
FDI approach based on interval models and methods is proposed (Puig, 2008). Interval methods are very appropriate when the 68 
modelling uncertainty is included in the model by means of interval parameters. Moreover, noise can easily handled using the 69 
interval methods since only a noise bound is required without any assumption about the statistical distribution. For both 70 
reasons, interval methods can be considered as an alternative to stochastic models and methods (Bassevile and Nikiforov, 71 
2003)(Nikiforov, 1998).  In Meseguer (2010), interval observers for fault detection have been already proposed for limnimeter 72 
fault detection. In this paper, alternatively interval parity equations expressed in regressor form are proposed.  The advantage 73 
of interval parity equations with respect to observers is that the algorithm proposed in (Blesa, 2011) for estimating interval 74 
parameters and generating detection thresholds can be used. Interval parity approaches are less computational demanding than 75 
observers because the parameters enter linearly in the equations. This fact has already noticed by Ploix and Adrot (2006) .   76 
 77 
In this paper, the problem of FDI is mainly focused on rain gauges and limnimeters used for the RTC of a sewer network, but 78 
could easily being extended to actuator faults or faults in other elements in the network. The proposed fault detection and 79 
isolation strategy is based on building an interval model for every instrument. Then, each instrument reading is compared with 80 
the prediction provided by its interval model. While, the real measurement is inside the interval of predicted behaviour (or 81 
envelope) generated using its interval model, no fault can be indicated. However, when the measurement is outside its 82 
envelope, a fault can be indicated (Puig, 2008). Once the fault has been detected, a fault isolation procedure is initiated in order 83 
to isolate the faulty instrument. The proposed FDI approach introduces also an improved interface between fault detection and 84 
isolation that reasons not only using binary information about fault signal activation but also considers residual fault 85 
sensitivities and time/order of activation. The need of such improved interface has been motivated because the application of 86 
the standard binary interface between fault detection and isolation could lead to wrong diagnosis when the residuals present 87 
different sensitivities and order/time of activation after the fault appearance (Combastel, 2003). The proposed diagnosis 88 
approach in this paper comes from an evolution of the algorithm presented in (Puig, 2005). In the literature, there have also 89 
appeared other proposals following the same spirit as the one proposed by (Van den Daele et al., 1997) where the activation of 90 
a residual generates an event with a belief and time stamp, among other attributes. Then, a reasoning using a causal graph 91 
produces a set of candidate faults ranked from the most to the least probable. In the same line, (Ragot, 2006) proposed an 92 
improved fault diagnosis approach based on the fuzzy evaluation of the residuals that considers not only binary information but 93 
also signs/sensitivities as well as the persistence of residual activation.  This approach has also been applied to a water 94 
network. 95 
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 96 
To exemplify the FDI problem in sewer networks and the proposed FDI methodology, the Barcelona network is used as the 97 
case study. Such network has a telemetry system containing 22 rain gauges and more than 100 limnimeters used for the RTC 98 
system.  In this paper, a representative part of this network is considered. 99 
 100 
The organisation of the paper is the following: Section 2 presents how models for FDI in rain-gauges and liminimeters are built 101 
and intervals for parameters are estimated. Section 3 overviews the proposed FDI scheme.  Section 4 and 5 discuss the 102 
implementation of the fault detection and isolation modules. Section 6 presents a description of the Barcelona sewer network 103 
used as a case study and shows the results obtained using the proposed FDI scheme. Finally, Section 7 closes the paper with 104 
the conclusions. 105 
 106 
2. INTERVAL MODELS FOR FDI IN SEWER NETWORKS 107 
 108 
Rain gauges and limnimeters are the two type of sensors used in the RTC of sewer networks: the first type measures rain 109 
intensity while the second one measures the sewer water level. In general, when detecting faults in sensors two strategies are 110 
possible: hardware redundancy based on the use of redundant (extra) sensors and analytical redundancy based on the use of a 111 
mathematical model that combines measurements from other correlated sensors or from the same sensor in past instants 112 
(Patton, 2000). In critical systems (space aircrafts, aeroplanes, ...) hardware redundancy is preferred. But, in large scale 113 
systems (as the case of sewer networks), the use of hardware redundancy is very expensive and increases the number of 114 
maintenance and calibration operations. That is the reason why analytical redundancy has been proved to be a good and 115 
cheaper alternative. This is the approach followed in this paper.  116 
 117 
2.1   Modelling limnimeters 118 
 119 
Typically, in sewer networks, sewage level is measured instead of flow. There are two reasons that can explain this fact. First 120 
since the level is measured using ultrasonic waves, limnimeters do not have contact with the sewage flow (Fig. 1), and 121 
consequently, the required maintenance is cheaper. Second, limnimeters are cheaper than flowmeters.   Ultrasonic limnimeters 122 
generates an acoustic pulse that is transmitted from the transducer and then it is reflected back from the surface of the liquid. 123 
The transit time is then converted into the current output, which is directly proportional to the fluid level.  From level 124 
measurements, the flow in a sewer can be estimated assuming steady-uniform flow and using the Manning formula calibrated 125 
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using experimental data  (Duchesne, 2001). However, as also discussed in (Duchesne, 2001), where there is not enough slope 126 
in the sewer, the backwater effect could appear leading to a complex relation between flow and level that can not be explained 127 
by a static relation as the Manning formula. In the sewer network locations where the backwater effect is important, the use of 128 
a flow meter instead of a limnimeter is advisable.  129 
 130 
Limnimeters can be monitored in rain scenarios1 using an on-line rainfall-runoff model of the sewer network that characterizes 131 
the net rainfall entering as flow in the sewers. The water flow in sewers due to runoff is open-channel. The Saint-Venant 132 
equations, based on physical principles of mass conservation and energy, allow describing accurately the open-channel flow in 133 
a sewer (Marinaki, 2005).  Such complex non-linear rainfall-runoff models are very useful for off-line operations (calibration 134 
and simulation) of the sewer network. But for on-line purposes, as the global optimal control and FDI, a simpler conceptual 135 
model must be used (Duchesne, 2001).  One possible modelling methodology to derive a rainfall-runoff real-time model of a 136 
sewer network is based on using a simplified graph relating the main sewers and catchments as a set of virtual reservoirs 137 
(Cembrano, 2004).  138 
 139 
 140 
 141 
Fig. 1. Limnimeter inside a sewer 142 
 143 
A virtual reservoir is an aggregation of a sewer capacity in a catchment of the sewer network which approximates the 144 
hydraulics of rain infiltration, runoff and sewage water retention thereof (Fig. 2).  145 
 146 
                                                 
1 In dry scenarios, to monitor limnimeters a different modelling approach (based on time series) could be used to exploit the temporal redundancy existing in 
the sensor measurements. These measurements follow the patterns of consumer drinking water demands with daily and weekly cycles as the flow meters in a 
drinking water network. In Quevedo et. al (2010), an approach to detect faults in flow meters in a drinking water network. 
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Fig. 2. Virtual reservoir model of a catchment 149 
 150 
The hydraulics of a virtual reservoir that models a catchment is given by 151 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )up down
dV t Q t Q t P t S
dt
                                                                  (1) 152 
where: V is the volume of water accumulated in the catchment, Qup and Qdown are flows entering and exiting the catchment, P is 153 
the rain intensity falling in the catchment, S its surface and  the ground absorption coefficient. Upstream and downstream 154 
sewage levels ( upL , downL ) are measured using limnimeters and they can be related with upstream/downstream flows 155 
( upQ , downQ ) using a linearised Manning relation: 156 
 157 
( ) ( )up up upQ t M L t                                                                    (2) 158 
( ) ( )down down downQ t M L t                                                                    (3) 159 
where upM , downM  are the limnimeter Manning coefficients estimated experimentally. 160 
It is additionally assumed that the catchment behave as a linear virtual tank, i.e., that a linear relation between the volume of 161 
the water stored in the virtual tank is linearly related with the flow downstream the catchment 162 
( ) ( )down vQ t K V t                                                                    (4) 163 
where vK is the volume/flow conversion coefficient estimated experimentally as well. 164 
Then, substituting (4) in (1) and discretising using the Euler method with a sampling time t , the following discrete-time 165 
relation (k is the discrete time) between upstream and downstream flows can be derived: 166 
 167 
( 1) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ))down v down v up vQ k K t Q k K tQ k K t SP k                                             (5)        168 
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Finally, replacing (2) and (3) in (5), leads to the following relation between upstream and downstream limnimeter 169 
measurements 170 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ))down down upL k aL k bL k cP k                                                                  (6)        171 
 172 
where:  173 
 (1 )va K t   , up v
down
M K t
b
M
  and v
down
K t S
c
M
                                                  174 
 175 
2.2   Modelling rain-gauges 176 
 177 
Typical rain-gauges used in sewer networks are of tipping bucket type (see Figure 3(a)). This gauge technology uses two small 178 
buckets mounted on a fulcrum (balanced like a see-saw) (see Figure 3(b)). The tiny buckets are manufactured with tight 179 
tolerances to ensure that they hold an exact amount of precipitation. The tipping bucket assembly is located above the rain 180 
sewer, which funnels the precipitation to the buckets. As rainfall fills the tiny bucket, it becomes overbalanced and tips down, 181 
emptying itself as the other bucket pivots into place for the next reading. The action of each tipping event triggers a small 182 
switch that activates the electronic circuitry to transmit the count to the indoor console, recording the event as a given number 183 
of mm/h of rainfall. The number of tipping events in a pre-established sampling time is accumulated and multiplied by a factor 184 
in order to obtain the rain intensity in m/s at each sampling time, after the appropriate unit conversion. 185 
 186 
          187 
(a)                                                                                     (b) 188 
Fig. 3. (a) A rain-gauge manufactured by Casella Measurement and (b) Principle of operation of a tipping bucket rain-gauge 189 
 190 
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In order to detect faults in a given rain-gauge Pi, a model that exploits spatial redundancy existing in the rain-gauge network is 191 
used. The model relates the measurements of rain-gauge Pi with the m most-correlated rain-gauges ( 1,..., mP P )  at time instant k 192 
as follows 193 
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )i m mP k P k P k P k                                                                 (7) 194 
The most correlated rain-gauges correspond to the ones that are the closest in distance as discussed in (Figueras et al., 2005). 195 
 196 
2.3   Estimation of interval models  197 
 198 
One of the key points in using the interval model based fault detection is how intervals of model parameters are estimated from 199 
scenarios free of faults. The estimation process should deliver a nominal model plus its modelling error in the form of interval 200 
parameters that will provide an interval of confidence for the predicted behaviour. Several authors ((Ploix, 1999) (Calafiore, 201 
2002)(Campi, 2009)) have suggested an adaptation of standard system identifications methods to provide the nominal model 202 
plus the uncertainty intervals for parameters that guarantee that all recorded data from the system in non-faulty scenarios will 203 
be included in the interval model. These algorithms are based on using standard identification methods (for example, least-204 
squares) to provide the nominal estimate for system parameters. Then, the intervals of uncertainty for parameters are adjusted 205 
until all the measured data is covered by the model prediction interval.  206 
 207 
The algorithm proposed in this paper considers that the interval model to be identified can be expressed in regressor form as 208 
follows   209 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )y k k k e k φ θ                                                                             (8)  210 
where:φ( k )  is the regressor vector of dimensions 1 n  which can contain any function of inputs ( ( )u k , ( )u k 1 , ( )u k 2 , ...) 211 
and outputs ( ( ), ( ), ( ), )y k y k 1 y k 2   , ( )e k is additive noise bounded by a constant ( )e k  , ( )k    is the parameter 212 
vector of dimensions 1n   and Θ  is an interval box centred in  the nominal  parameter values 1[ ] [ ] [ ]i n      Θ    213 
where 0 0[ ] [ ]i i i i i,      , i=1,…, n , with 0i  being the nominal parameter values and i 0   the parameter 214 
uncertainties. The uncertain interval parameter set Θ  can be parameterised as a particular case of a zonotope (Blesa et al, 215 
2011) as follows: 216 
 0 : n  zΘ θ H z B                                                                             (9) 217 
with centre 0   and matrix uncertainty shape H equal to a n n  diagonal matrix:  218 
 0 1 2 n, , ,      219 
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 1 2, ,..., ndiag    H  220 
and 1n nB   is a unitary box composed by n unitary (  1,1 B ) interval vectors  where n n .   221 
 222 
Then, proceeding as in Blesa et al (2011), the maximum and minimum values of the prediction provided by model (8) with 223 
uncertain parameter set (9) are given by 224 
0
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )y k y k k  Hφ                                                                         (10) 225 
      0 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )y k y k k  Hφ                                                                         (11) 226 
where 0ˆ ( )y k  is the model output prediction with nominal parameters: 0 0ˆ ( ) ( )y k k φ θ . In the particular case of interval 227 
parameters:  1
1
( ) φ ( )
n
i i
i
k k

 Hφ  .                            228 
Then, given a sequence of data in a fault free scenario (measurements of regressor vector ( )kφ  and output ( )y k  for 229 
1,...,k N ) and rich enough from the identifiability point of view, the estimation problem boils down in determining the 230 
nominal parameter vector ( 0θ ) and the parameter uncertainty (defined by matrix H ) in such a way that all the measurements 231 
are inside the prediction interval (given by bounds (10) and (11)) and, the size of intervals for parameters is minimised. 232 
The identification of 0θ  and H  can be carried out in two steps: In the first step, nominal vector parameter can be identified 233 
(by conventional methods, i.e least squares). Then, in the second the parameter uncertainties defined by H  can be computed. 234 
From equations (10) and (11), the smallest intervals for parameters that satisfy ˆ ˆ( ) ( ), ( )y k y k y k     for 1,...,k N  can be 235 
computed solving the following optimization problem 236 
                                                                   min ( ( ))vol
H
Θ H  237 
subject to:            0 1ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )y k k y k  Hφ               1,...,k N                              (12) 238 
                             0 1ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )y k k y k  Hφ   239 
                              240 
In order to reduce the complexity of the optimization problem (12), the uncertain parameter set Θ can be parameterised such 241 
that a pre-determined shape 0H , as proposed in Blesa et al (2011),  is used. The shape 0H  can be estimated, for example, 242 
from the parameter variance of estimated nominal model: 0 H H . Other heuristics could also be used (for more details see 243 
Blesa et al (2011)).                                                                     244 
In the case of considering 0 H H , the optimal solution of (12) is provided by: 245 
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 246 
 
0
1,..., 0 1
ˆ( ) ( )
sup
( )k N
y k y k
k
       φ H
                                                         (13) 247 
 248 
3. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FDI SCHEME 249 
 250 
3.1  Introduction 251 
The standard FDI scheme is based on generating a set of numerical fault indicators, known as residuals which are computed 252 
using analytical redundancy relations (obtained from model equations) and the measured inputs and outputs of the monitored 253 
system.  Then, the fault detection task consists in deciding if there is a fault affecting the monitored system by checking each 254 
residual against a threshold that takes into account model uncertainty, noise and the unknown disturbances. The result of this 255 
test applied to every residual produces an observed fault signature.  The observed fault signature is  supplied to the fault 256 
isolation module that will try to isolate the fault by looking at theoretical binary fault signature matrix where a  binary relation 257 
between the considered fault hypothesis set. However, when applying this standard FDI scheme to limnimeters and rain-258 
gauges in sewers networks, the following drawbacks were noticed: 259 
(a) The detection threshold should be determined and adapted on-line according to the system inputs and outputs taking into 260 
account the model uncertainty. 261 
(b) The presence of the noise produces chattering if a binary evaluation of the residual is used. 262 
(c) All residuals affected by a certain fault should be activated at the same time instant and they should be persistently 263 
keeping activated during the whole fault isolation process. Otherwise, a wrong fault diagnosis result could be given.  264 
(d) Restricting the relation between faults and fault signals to a binary one causes a loss of useful information that can add 265 
fault distinguishability and accurateness to the fault isolation algorithm preventing possible wrong fault diagnosis results.  266 
 267 
3.2  Proposed FDI scheme 268 
 269 
To deal with the previous issues, the FDI scheme, presented in Figure 4, is proposed. This scheme is composed of different 270 
modules that play the following role (Fig. 4): 271 
 272 
11 
 
- Fault detection module is based on evaluating the residual against an adaptive threshold generated evaluating the 273 
interval parity equations that evolves along time taking into account model uncertainty and noise (Puig, 2008) (see 274 
Section 4 for more details). 275 
- Fault detection/isolation interface module evaluates fault signals generated by the fault detection module in order to 276 
isolate the fault among the considered fault hypotheses using several indicators which take into account not only the 277 
activation value of the fault signal but also its fault sensitivity/sign and its activation time/order. This improved 278 
interface module try to handle the problems associated with the fault signal persistency, the residual sensitivity to a 279 
fault, the fault signal occurrence order and the fault signal occurrence time instant (see Section 4 and Appendix 1 for 280 
more details). 281 
- Fault isolation module reasons with the information provided by all the indicators/fault signature matrices to achieve 282 
the fault isolation (see Section 5 for more details). 283 
The underlying assumptions considered in the proposed FDI approach are that no multiple faults  (“single fault hypothesis”) 284 
and faults can be modelled in an additive way as in the standard FDI approaches (Gerlter, 1998). 285 
 286 
Fig. 4. FDI proposed scheme 287 
 288 
4. FAULT DETECTION MODULE AND INTERFACE WITH FAULT ISOLATION MODULE  289 
 290 
4.1  Fault detection module 291 
The fault detection module is based on the evaluation of the nominal residual obtained from difference between measurements 292 
and model prediction using model in regressor form (8) 293 
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ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )o o or k y k y k y k k   φ θ                                                            (14) 294 
where oθ  are the nominal parameters. 295 
Taking into account parametric modelling errors, the detection test consists in evaluating the following condition  296 
( ) ( ), ( )
ooo
ii ir k r k r k                                                                                    (15) 297 
where: ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )o oii ir k y k y k   and ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )o oi i ir k y k y k   while ˆ ( )iy k  and ˆ ( )iy k  are the bounds of the ith-system output 298 
prediction calculated using (10) and (11). 299 
 300 
Test condition (15), equivalently, can be expressed as follows: 301 
 302 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ), ( )i iiy k y k y k                                                                             (16) 303 
4.2  Mininum detectable 304 
The effect of faults in the residual can be expressed in terms of the residual fault sensitivity that leads to the residual internal 305 
form (Gertler, 1998). In case of considering additive input ( uf ) and output ( yf ) sensor faults, the computational form of the 306 
residual (14) can be expressed as follows: 307 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
y u
o
f y f ur k S q f k S q f k
                                                      (17) 308 
where 1( )
yfS q
 and 1( )
ufS q
  are the residual fault output and input sensitivity transfer functions. Considering residual (14), 309 
the sensitivities are given by:  1 0( )( ) 1
yf
y
kS q
f
   
φ θ  and 1 0( )( )
uf
u
kS q
f
   
φ θ . 310 
According to Gertler (1998), the minimum detectable fault min ( )if k  corresponds to a size of fault  that brings a residual (15) to 311 
its threshold (“triggering limit”), assuming that no other faults and nuisance inputs are present.  312 
When using the fault detection (16) (or (15), a fault ( )f k  will always be detected when its fault effect ( ( )f k ) is bigger than 313 
the interval prediction thickness ( ( )r k ). In the case of using model (8) with parameters (9), they can be computed according 314 
to (Blesa et al., 2011) as follows: 1( ) ( ) ( )f fk S q f k
   and 1δ ( ) 2 ( ) 2r k k  φ H  where 1( )fS q  is the residual fault 315 
sensitivity transfer function that characterizes the effect of fault in the residual. Then the minimum detectable fault can be 316 
computed as 317 
min 1
1
2 ( ) 2
( )
( )
f
f
k
f k
S q
 φ H                                                           (18) 318 
Notice that minimum detectable fault defined by Eq. (17) is not a constant value, but a value that evolves dynamically and 319 
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depends on the operation point (defined by ( )kφ ). Then, the minimum steady state detectable fault can be obtained considering 320 
1
1( ) |f qS q

  in Eq (18). Analogously, the minimum initial detectable fault can be obtained considering 
1( ) |f qS q

  in (18).  321 
 322 
4.2  Interface between fault detection and isolation 323 
 324 
The fault detection test (16) relies on the comparison of the nominal residual ( )oir k , which may be affected by noise, with its 325 
associated adaptive threshold (interval [ ( ), ( )]
oo
iir k r k ). This binary procedure may lead to undesirable decision instability 326 
(chattering) because of the effect of noise on the sensor measurements. Such as indicated by the DMP-approach (Petti et al., 327 
1990), a gradual reasoning based on the use of fuzzy evaluation is an appealing alternative to bypass this chattering 328 
phenomenon. Then, the fault diagnostic signal (or fault signal) for each residual is calculated in the approach presented in this 329 
paper using the Kramer function (Petti et al., 1990): 330 
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                                       (19) 331 
The appealing performance of this function is due to the grading that introduces when evaluating the residual in order to 332 
conclude about the fault existence. When using Eq. (19), the residuals are normalized to a metric between -1 and 1, 333 
 ( ) 1,1i k   , which indicates the degree of satisfaction of Eq. (16) for every nominal residual ( )oir k : 0 for perfectly 334 
satisfied, 1 for severely violated high and -1 for severely violated low.  335 
 336 
5. FAULT ISOLATION MODULE 337 
 338 
The fault isolation module used in this paper derives from the one used proposed in (Puig et al., 2005) (see Figure 5). The first 339 
component is a memory that stores information about the fault signal occurrence history and the fault detection module updates 340 
it cyclically. The pattern comparison component compares the memory contents with the stored fault patterns. The standard 341 
Boolean fault signature matrix concept (Gertler, 1998) is generalized taking into account more fault signal properties. The last 342 
component represents the decision logic part of the method which aim is to propose the most probable fault candidate. 343 
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Fig. 5.  Fault isolation module components 345 
 346 
5.1 Memory component 347 
 348 
The memory component consists of a table in which events in the residual history are stored. For each row, the first column 349 
stores the event occurrence time ti, the second one stores the maximum activation value ,maxi  computed according to  350 
 
 ,max
,
( )max
o o w
i i
k k k T
k 
 
                                                     (20) 351 
for every fault signal, and the last one stores the sign of the residual. Fault signals with ,max 0.5i  are filtered out. Using this 352 
strategy the effect of noise and non-persistent fault indicators are filtered because just the peaks of activation are stored. If the 353 
fault detection component detects a new residual event (that is, ( ) 0.5i k  )), the memory component table is updated by 354 
adding a new row that contains all previous event information. The problem of different time instant appearance of fault 355 
signals ( )i k  is solved not indicating the isolation decision until a prefixed waiting time Tw has elapsed from the first fault 356 
signal appearance. This Tw is calculated from the larger transient time response Tlt  from non-faulty situation to any faulty 357 
situation. After this time has elapsed, a diagnosis is proposed and the memory component is reset being ready to start the 358 
diagnosis of a new fault. Inside this diagnosis window, the maximum activation value of the memory-table ,maxi  359 
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corresponding to residual i changes only if the current activation value 0( )i k  is superior to the previous ones according to 360 
(20).  361 
 362 
5.2 Pattern comparison component 363 
 364 
The pattern comparison component compares the memory contents with the stored fault patterns. Given a set of residuals, 0ir , 365 
and the considered set of faults  mj ffffF ,...,...,, 21 , each 0ir is affected by a subset of these faults. The fault patterns are 366 
organized according to a theoretical fault signature matrix, named FSM. An element FSMij of the matrix contains the pattern if 367 
fj is expected to affect 0ir , otherwise, it is equal to 0. This interpretation assumes that the occurrence of fj is observable in
0
ir , 368 
hypothesis known as fault exoneration or no compensation, and that fj  is the only fault affecting the monitored system. Five 369 
different fault signature matrices are considered in the evaluation task: Boolean fault signal activation (FSM01), fault signal 370 
signs (FSMsign), fault residual sensitivity (FSMsensit), and, finally, fault signal occurrence order (FSMorder) and time   371 
(FSMtime). Theses matrices can be obtained from the analysis of residual fault sensitivity (17). Details on how the general 372 
rules to obtain those matrices from (19) are derived can be found in (Meseguer, 2007;2009). In the Appendix 2, the detailed 373 
definition and usage of these matrices is presented.  374 
  375 
5.3 Decision logic component 376 
 377 
The decision logic algorithm starts when the first residual is activated (that is, ( ) 0.5i k  ) and lasts Tw time instants or till all 378 
fault hypotheses except one are rejected because they do not fulfil the observed residual activation order/time or because an 379 
unexpected activation signal has been observed according to those fault hypotheses.  Rejection is based on using the results of 380 
factor01j, factorsignj and  factororderj. That is the case, if any of these factors is ’zero’ for a given fault hypotheses, it will be 381 
rejected. Every factor represents some kind of filter, which only lets slip through the possible fault hypotheses. At the end of 382 
the time window Tw, for each non-rejected fault hypothesis, a fault isolation indicator is calculated using the factors 383 
factorsensitj and factortimej. Thus, the biggest fault isolation indicator will determine the diagnosed fault. The fault isolation 384 
indicator associated to the fault hypothesis fj is determined as it follows: 385 
 386 
 max( , )j j jd sensit time factor factor                                               (21) 387 
           388 
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So, the final diagnosis result can be expressed as a set of fault candidates with their associated fault isolation indicator. 389 
 390 
5.4 Comparison with existing approaches 391 
The fault isolation approach presented in this paper has been compared in (Puig, 2005) with other approaches commonly used 392 
in the literature, namely:  393 
 the standard FDI binary approach (Gertler, 1998) based on looking for a column of the fault signature matrix  that 394 
matches the observed fault signature (called column reasoning in Cordier et al. (2004))  395 
 the DX approach based of reasoning only with the activated fault signals and the corresponding rows of the fault 396 
signature matrix (called row reasoning in Cordier et al, (2004),  397 
 the DMP approach proposed by Petti et al. (1990) that only reasons with the fault residual sensitivity (FSMsensit) and  398 
 the DTS approach proposed by Kóscielny (1995) that uses the knowledge about the times in which fault signal should 399 
be activated after the fault is detected. This approach looks at a row of the fault signature matrix only after its fault 400 
signal detection time has elapsed (similar to row reasoning approach). But, in this way it is looking step-by-step at all 401 
rows, counting ones and zeros (similar to column reasoning approach). 402 
The comparison in Puig et al. (2005)  has been done using the well known two tank system described in Blanke et al. (2006), 403 
considering six different faults in scenarios with different fault sizes. Two performance criteria have been used for comparison:  404 
 The diagnostic resolution defined as the average number of valid fault hypotheses per diagnosis, and the best possible 405 
value is 1. 406 
 The diagnostic error rate defined as the average percentage of wrong diagnoses. An error rate of 0 is desirable.  407 
Thus, the optimal point in the error rate/diagnostic resolution-plane is (0/1). Figure 6 shows how the different methods are 408 
positioned in this plane. It can be noticed that the proposed method is the one that approaches the most to the optimal point.  409 
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 410 
Fig. 6.  Comparison of the proposed approach with commonly used 411 
 approaches in the error rate/diagnostic resolution-plane 412 
 413 
5.5 Extension to address multiple faults 414 
In section, some ideas on how the proposed method could be extended to deal with the multiple faults case. As discussed in 415 
Koscielny (2003), when dealing with multiple faults two types of situations are considered depending if the faults appear in 416 
simultaneous or sequential way. In order to use the proposed fault isolation approach in case of simultaneous faults (i.e., faults 417 
that appear in a time smaller than the waiting time Tw) two cases can be considered: 418 
- in case the fault signals do not present different time of appearance, the fault signature matrices should be extended 419 
adding extract columns to consider the case of multiple faults as in the standard FDI approach (see Gertler, 1998). 420 
More precisely, a new column for each combination of possible multiple fault to be considered should be added.  421 
- on the other hand, if the fault signals present different time of appearance, the diagnostic inference may fail if two or 422 
more faults occur at a time interval that is shorter than the time window Tw needed for diagnosis. So this situation is 423 
not supported by the algorithm. 424 
Finally, in case of sequential faults (i.e., faults that appear in a time bigger than the waiting time Tw), the approach can be used 425 
under the assumption of single faults, but reconfiguring the fault signature matrices by removing the faulty sensors and the 426 
residual expressions where they appear should be derived again.  For more details see Figureras et al, (2005). 427 
 428 
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 429 
 430 
6.  APPLICATION TO THE BARCELONA SEWER NETWORK 431 
 432 
6.1   Description 433 
The city of Barcelona, with a population of around 1.593.000 inhabitants living on a surface of 98 Km2 approximately, has a 434 
combined sewage system of approximately 1697 Km length with a storage capacity of 3.038.622 m3. It is a unitary system that 435 
combines waste and rainwater into the same sewers. The yearly rainfall is not very high (600 mm/year), but it includes heavy 436 
storms (arriving to 90 mm/h) typical of the Mediterranean climate that can cause a lot of flooding problems and combined 437 
sewer overflow (CSO) to the receiving environment. Clavegueram de Barcelona, S.A. (CLABSA) is the company in charge of 438 
the sewage system management. Nowadays, for control purposes, the urban drainage system contains 21 pumping stations, 36 439 
gates, 10 valves and 10 detention tanks which are regulated in order to prevent flooding and to CSO the environment. The 440 
remote control system is equipped with 56 remote stations including 22 rain-gauges and 136 water-level sensors which provide 441 
real-time information (every 5 minutes) about rainfall and water levels into the sewer system. All this information is 442 
centralized at the CLABSA Control Centre through a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The 443 
regulated elements (pumps, gates and detention tanks) are currently controlled locally, i.e., they are handled from the remote 444 
control centre according to the measurements of sensors connected only to the local station. 445 
 446 
6.2   FDI in  limnimeters 447 
 448 
6.2.1 Introduction 449 
In order to show the proposed FDI methodology in liminimeters, a representative portion of the Barcelona sewer network is 450 
studied. The considered portion has a surface of 22,6 Km2 and is constituted by 11 catchments. The considered part of the 451 
network can be analysed separately from the rest of the network.  In this part of the network there are 15 level gauges 452 
(limnimeters) and 4 rain-gauges. Using the virtual tank modelling methodology presented in Section 2.1, a model for this part 453 
of the network is presented in Figure 7 where every catchment is represented by a virtual tank. The structure of the model 454 
comes from the network physical topology.   The models of each liminimeter (L3, L7, L8, L9, L16, L19, L27, L39, L41, L45, L54, L56 455 
and L80) come from the application of Eq. (5) to the virtual tanks appearing in Figure 72.  Figure 8 shows the Boolean fault 456 
                                                 
2 The weirs appearing in Figure 7 in the considered fault scenarios are not overflowing. This is the reason why in the limnimeter models, the overflowing 
paths have not been considered. If overflowing paths are considered, the structure of the limnimeter models would change. This means that the behaviour of 
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signature matrix (FSM01) corresponding to set of residuals that are obtained from the liminimeter models.  The other fault 457 
signature matrices (FSMsign, FSMsensit, FSMorder and FSMtime) are obtained from the analysis of residual fault sensitivity 458 
(19), as discussed in Section 5.3, as described in (Meseguer, 2007;2009). In Appendix 2, the content of these matrices is 459 
presented for this application.  460 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 461 
Fig. 7. Virtual reservoir model of the portion of Barcelona network considered 462 
463 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the network change according to its state, that is, it is a hybrid system. This would imply extending the proposed approach to hybrid systems. This is currently 
an on-going work which preliminary results can be found in Vento et al. (2010). 
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 464 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80 fP4 fP6 fP13 fP16 fP20rL3 X X X 
rL7 X X X 
rL8 X X X
rL9 X X 
rL16 X X X X 
rL19 X X 
rL27 X X
rL39 X X 
rL41 X X X 
rL45 X X X
rL54 X X X
rL56 X X 
rL80 X X  465 
 466 
Fig. 8. Boolean fault signature matrix of  limnimeter: residuals  are in rows and faults in columns 467 
  (“X” represents “1” and a blank a “0”) 468 
 469 
6.2.2 Liminmeter interval model identification 470 
 471 
After the structure of the model for each limnimeter has been obtained, the nominal values and intervals for the parameters are 472 
determined using the interval identification method presented in Section 2.3. In order to illustrate how such procedure works, 473 
the interval model identification of liminimeter L03 is presented. According to Figure 7, the model of this limnimeter has the 474 
following structure 03 03 27 06( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )L k aL k bL k cP k     according to Eq. (6). Thus, to use the interval identification 475 
algorithm, this model should be expressed in regressor form (8). In this case, the regressor is given by 476 
 03 27 06( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k L k L k P kφ  while the vector of parameters is given by  ( ) Tk a b cθ . A set of 50 selected real  477 
scenarios between 1999 and 2003, free of faults, have been selected for estimating the model parameters and their intervals. 478 
The resulting nominal values are  0.9014 0.06717 0.1861 To θ  while the intervals are given by 479 
(0.0451,0.0034,0.0093)diagH  according to Eq. (9). Figure 9 shows the interval model prediction using the nominal 480 
parameter values and intervals for limnimeter L03 for a subset of data used for estimation, while Figure 10 shows the interval 481 
model prediction for a subset of data used for validation. 482 
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 483 
Fig. 9. Estimation of interval model corresponding to limnimeter L03 484 
 485 
Fig. 10.  Validation of interval model corresponding to limnimeter L03 486 
 487 
 488 
6.2.3 Liminimeter fault scenario 489 
 490 
To show how the fault isolation procedure proposed in this paper works in case of liminimeters, a real fault scenario recorded 491 
at 14/09/1999 affecting L27 is studied. A fault in this sensor appeared at time instant 4000s. Figure 11 presents residuals r030 492 
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and r270, that is, the residuals where L27 is involved according to fault signature matrix (see Figure 8). Those residuals are 493 
evaluated using the adaptive threshold provided by their interval model. The fault is detected when the limnimeter 494 
measurement (in continous line) goes out to the prediction interval (in dash line). Notice that the fault in both residuals is 495 
detected at different time instants. Moreover, notice that residual r270 is activated only for a short period of time, although the 496 
fault is still present. The reason is because detection is based on using parity equations that use model (8) in regressor form. 497 
Since the model prediction (8) uses the faulty measurements, after some samples this prediction is contaminated by the fault 498 
and the residual come back inside the prediction interval. This phenomenon is known as the fault following effect (see Puig, 499 
2008 for more details). 500 
Figure 12 shows the time evolution of fault isolation factors (factor01, factorsign, factorsensit, factororder  and factortime). 501 
The fault isolation process starts after the first residual r270 is activated  at time instant 4000 s (see Figure 11). Using only 502 
binary information (factor01), the fault candidates would be first L27  but later L03, as it can be seen from Figure 12. This is due 503 
to the fact that the first the residual r270 activates, but later it is deactivated (lack of persistence in the fault signal indication). In 504 
particular, when  r030,  that appears later (at time 7900s), is activated, r270 is deactivated. So, residuals r030 and r270 are never 505 
activated at the same time.  However, using the information of factororder, a fault in L03 would imply that the first residual 506 
activated should be r030 instead of r270. So, L03  can be already excluded as a fault candidate because is not consistent with the 507 
expected order of activation.  Later, at time 7900s, the second residual r030 is activated confirming that the fault is in L27. 508 
Moreover, from the factortime, the FDI module knows that the fault isolation process is ended and it has not to wait until the 509 
end of the time window.  510 
 511 
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Fig. 11. Time evolution of the residuals r030  and r270 with their adaptive thresholds 513 
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Fig. 12. Time evolution of factor indicators 515 
24 
 
 516 
6.2.4 Evaluation of the FDI performance 517 
 518 
Fault detection performance has been assessed by the evaluation of the minimum detectable fault defined in Section 4.1. The 519 
initial and steady state values of the minimum detectable fault for the different residuals are presented in Appendix 3. Since the 520 
proposed method stores and works with the maximum value of activated fault signals according to (20), the minimum 521 
detectable fault size is given by the maximum value of the residual fault sensitivity (see Eq. (18)). 522 
On the other hand, regarding fault isolation performance, the minimum isolable fault corresponding to each fault can be 523 
obtained by finding the maximum of the minimum detectable faults associated to all the residuals that are sensitive to this fault.  524 
This fact implies that the minimum isolable fault in case of the proposed approach will be smaller than in the case of the 525 
standard FDI approach. The reason is related to the fact that in the proposed approach the minimum detectable fault size is 526 
given by the maximum value of the residual fault sensitivity as discussed above. This can be easily seen by looking at the 527 
results presented in Appendix 3. Looking for example at output faults (diagonal of the tables in Appendix 3),  the smaller size 528 
of minimum detectable fault corresponds to the one obtained with the initial fault sensitivity value computed using (18) 529 
considering 1 1( ) |f qS q

 . On the other hand, using the classic FDI approach (see Gertler, 1998) which reasons continuously 530 
with residuals using a column-based reason scheme, since all the residuals sensitive to a fault should be activated to isolate the 531 
fault,  the minimum isolable fault corresponding to each fault can be obtained by finding the maximum of the minimum steady 532 
state detectable faults computed using (18) considering 1( ) |f qS q

 . As it can be noticed from the tables  in Appendix 3, the 533 
values of the initial minimum detectable faults for outputs faults are smaller than the corresponding ones in steady state.  534 
 535 
6.3   FDI in  rain-gauges 536 
 537 
6.3.1 Introduction 538 
 539 
The telemetry system of Barcelona sewer network contains 22 rain gauges that are connected to the CLABSA control centre 540 
and provide the rain intensity every 5 minutes.  Figure 13 presents the location of those rain-gauges on the Barcelona map. 541 
Each rain gauge is represented by a small square and a name (black squares correspond to the rain-gauges used in the test 542 
catchment presented in Fig. 7, while red squares are the rest of rain-gauges of the sewer network). Spatial models for rain-543 
gauges are derived from the correlation analysis (based on the computation of the correlation matrix) between all the existent 544 
rain-gauges in the telemetry system. This allows deriving which are the most correlated rain-gauges with a given rain-gauge 545 
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under test. These correlation analyses have been applied not only to a particular rain scenario but to a 48 rain scenarios in a 5 546 
year rain-data records. The result of the correlation analysis for the whole set of rain-gauges of the Barcelona sewer network is 547 
presented in the table presented in Figure 14. In this table, for each rain-gauge in rows appear the three most correlated 548 
(derived from the correlation matrix) rain-gauges with the associated explained variance. 549 
 550 
Fig. 13. Barcelona’s rain-gauge network (rain-gauges are represented with squares) 551 
 552 
1 % 2 % 3 %
P01 18 15.60 21 12.76 8 12.76
P02 15 17.02 12 15.60 13 14.18
P03 19 26.08 16 16.66 17 7.97
P04 21 22.22 20 17.77 19 9.62
P05 20 17.24 14 14.94 13 14.94
P06 11 26.66 14 20.74 10 17.77
P07 3 14.39 10 11.36 19 11.36
P08 1 21.01 15 13.04 22 12.31
P09 17 20.13 19 15.97 18 15.97
P10 11 25.18 6 22.22 14 12.59
P11 6 28.88 10 18.51 14 14.07
P12 2 23.07 13 22.22 15 11.96
P13 2 14.89 12 13.47 5 11.34
P14 6 21.01 16 13.76 11 12.31
P15 2 18.75 22 18.05 21 12.50
P16 3 15.21 6 13.04 19 10.86
P17 9 22.91 19 19.44 3 11.80
P18 1 15.27 21 14.58 9 13.19
P19 3 23.91 17 15.21 4 11.59
P20 4 18.84 5 12.31 13 10.86
P21 4 19.14 15 13.47 18 11.34
P22 15 24.82 2 16.31 21 8.51  553 
Fig. 14. Correlation table of the rain-gauges of Barcelona sewer network 554 
 555 
Once the most correlated rain-gauges have been derived the following question to answer is how many rain-gauge should be 556 
considered in order to build a fault detection model for a given rain-gauge. To answer this question, there is a compromise 557 
between fault detection and fault isolation model properties. An increase in the number of rain-gauges used to model the rain-558 
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gauge under test improves the model prediction quality, but decreases the capacity to isolate the faulty rain-gauge due to a 559 
model is affected by the faults of more rain-gauges. In Figueras et al. (2005), it has been shown that three rain-gauges, 560 
providing the 70% of data variance, was a good number in this application since provide the best trade-off between model 561 
quality and fault isolation capabilities in case of multiple sequential faults. Figure 15 presents the fault signature matrix in case 562 
that the three most correlated rain-gauges are used to build the models. 563 
 564 
fP1 fP2 fP3 fP4 fP5 fP6 fP7 fP8 fP9 fP10 fP11 fP12 fP13 fP14 fP15 fP16 fP17 fP18 fP19 fP20 fP21 fP22
rP1 X X X X
rP2 X X X X
rP3 X X X X
rP4 X X X X
rP5 X X X X
rP6 X X X X
rP7 X X X X
rP8 X X X X
rP9 X X X X
rP10 X X X X
rP11 X X X X
rP12 X X X X
rP13 X X X X
rP14 X X X X
rP15 X X X X
rP16 X X X X
rP17 X X X X
rP18 X X X X
rP19 X X X X
rP20 X X X X
rP21 X X X X
rP22 X X X  565 
Fig. 15. Boolean signature of the rain-gauge residuals (in rows) of Barcelona’s network 566 
 and faults (in columns) (“X” represents “1” and a blank a “0”) 567 
 568 
6.3.2 Rain-gauge interval model identification  569 
As in the case of liminimeters, once the structure of the model for each rain-gauge has been derived, the nominal values and 570 
intervals for the parameters are determined using the interval identification method presented in Section 2.3. In order to 571 
illustrate how such procedure works in this case, the interval model identification of rain-gauge P04 is presented. According to 572 
Figure 15, the model of this rain-gauge considering the three most correlated ones has the following 573 
structure: 04 1 19 2 20 3 21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P k P k P k P k      (see Eq. (7)). . Thus, to use the interval identification algorithm, this model 574 
should be expressed in regressor form (8) with the regressor given by  19 20 21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k P k P k P kφ  while the vector of 575 
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parameters is given by  1 2 3( ) Tk    θ . As in the case of liminimeters, a set of 50 scenarios between 1999 and 2003, 576 
free of faults, have been selected for calibrating the model parameters and their intervals. The resulting nominal values are 577 
 0.1939 0.3582 0.4479 To θ  while the intervals are given by (0.0097,0.0179,0.0224)diagH according to Eq. (9). 578 
Figure 16 shows the interval model prediction for rain-gauge P04 for a subset of data used for estimation, while Figure 17 579 
shows the interval model prediction for a subset of data used for validation. 580 
 581 
 582 
Fig. 16. Estimation of interval model corresponding to limnimeter P04 583 
 584 
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 585 
Fig. 17. Validation of interval model corresponding to limnimeter P04 586 
 587 
6.3.3 Rain-gauge faulty scenario  588 
 589 
To show the effectiveness of the proposed FDI approach in case of rain-gauges, a real fault scenario recorded at 15/11/2001 is 590 
considered. In this case, a fault in rain-gauge P9  was present. This fault was noticed by sewer network operators just by visual 591 
inspection comparing this rain gauges with the closest  (most correlated) ones. Results from checking real measurements taken 592 
from rain-gauge P9  are compared with their corresponding prediction interval generated using an interval model built from the 593 
three most correlated rain-gauges (P17, P18 and P19) (see Figure 18). Figure 19 and 20 presents the residuals corresponding to 594 
rain-gauges P17 and P18  where rain-gauge P9  is also used according to the fault signature matrix in Figure 15. Figure 21 595 
presents the time evolution of factorsensit for the rain-gauges P9, P17 and P18 . It can be noticed that P9 will be proposed as the 596 
candidate faulty rain-gauge according to (21).   Since rain-gauge models are static, factortime and factororder are not used in 597 
the rain-gauge fault isolation.  598 
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 599 
Fig. 18 Fault in rain-gauge P09 in the 15/11/2001 rain-scenario 600 
 601 
     602 
Fig. 19. Fault in rain-gauge P09 in the 15/11/2001 rain-scenario 603 
 604 
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 605 
Fig. 20.  Fault in rain-gauge P09 in the 15/11/2001 rain-scenario 606 
 607 
Fig. 21. Time evolution of factorsensit indicators 608 
 609 
 610 
 611 
 612 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 613 
 614 
In this paper, fault detection and isolation in rain gauges and limnimeters of Barcelona’s urban sewer system is presented. The 615 
proposed FDI strategy is based on building a linear interval model for every instrument. Then, each instrument is tested 616 
according the prediction provided by its interval model obtained from real data using the parity equation approach. While, the 617 
real measurement is inside the interval of predicted behaviour no fault can be indicated. However, when the measurement is 618 
outside its envelope a fault can be indicated. Once the fault has been detected, a fault isolation procedure is initiated in order to 619 
isolate the faulty instrument. Fault isolation is based on matching of the fault signature with a set of theoretical fault signatures. 620 
Finally, the proposed FDI system is applied to several real scenarios providing promising results in order to be applied in real-621 
time operation.  As a further work the proposed method will be applied to faults in actuators. Currently, the proposed FDI 622 
method is being integrated with MPC control system of the sewer network in order to validate rain-gauges and limnimeters 623 
readings. In case that some instrument is in faulty situation, some fault tolerance mechanism should be activated to allow the 624 
control system to continue in operation. The design of these fault tolerance mechanisms are also currently under development. 625 
 626 
APPENDIX 1 627 
This appendix describes the different fault signatures matrices used for the fault isolation module presented in Section 5 as well 628 
as their usage:  629 
 630 
FSM01: Evaluation of fault signal appearance. The FSM01-table contains the theoretical binary patterns that faults produce in 631 
the residual equations. Those patterns can be codified using the values 0 for no influence, 1 otherwise.  factor01j is calculated 632 
for the jth fault hypothesis in the following way: 633 
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and the zero-violation-factor as 637 
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This leads to the following behaviour: expected fault signals support a fault hypothesis, unexpected fault signals are eliminated 640 
through the zero-violation-factor. Missing fault signals influence the supportability of a hypothesis indirectly via the 641 
denominator of Eq. (22). 642 
 643 
FSMsign: Evaluation of fault signal signs. The FSMsign-table contains the theoretical sign patterns that faults produce in the 644 
residual equations. Those patterns can be codified using the values 0 for no influence, +1/-1 for positive/negative deviation for 645 
every FSMsignij. 646 
 647 
The factorsignj is calculated comparing theoretical signs to the signs stored in the memory: 648 
 649 
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FSMsign
                                              (23) 650 
where  the number of signs in the fault signal vector that coincides with each jth fault hypothesis, considering either the case 651 
that all residuals have been violated in the positive or negative patterns in FSMsignij is given by 652 
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 657 
where the factor jsignzvf is defined in a similar way as in the case of 01factor , excluding those fault hypothesis that has a 658 
zero in a position where the fault signal presents a sign. The sign function is defined as in MATLAB, i.e., ( ) 1sign x   if 0x  , 659 
( ) 1sign x    if 0x   and ( ) 0sign x   if 0x  . 660 
 661 
33 
 
FSMsensit: Evaluation of fault sensitivities. This evaluation component uses the fault signal activation values  ,maxi  from the 662 
memory table and computes factorsensit using the sensitivity-based FSMsensit table for weighting the activation values. That 663 
approach can be found as well in the DMP-method (Petti, et al., 1990). The following equations describe how to calculate the 664 
entries FSMsensitji 665 
 666 
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with the sensitivity defined as 
o
i
ij
j
r
S
f
  . Although, the sensitivity depends on time in case of a dynamic system, here the 668 
steady-state value after a fault occurrence is considered as it was also suggested in (Gertler, 1998). The value of FSMsensitij 669 
describes, how easily a fault will cause a violation of the threshold of the ith  residual since the larger its partial derivative with 670 
respect to the fault, the more sensitive that equation is to deviations of the assumption. Similarly, residuals with large detection 671 
thresholds are less sensitive as they are more difficult to violate. Therefore FSMsensitij can be used to weight the activation 672 
value of different fault signals: 673 
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 676 
where the factor jsensitzvf is defined in a similar way as in the case of factor01, excluding those fault hypothesis that has a 677 
zero theoretical sensitivity while fault signal presents an non-zero value. 678 
 679 
FSMorder: Evaluation of fault signal appearance order. In dynamic systems a fault fj  does not affect at same time all 680 
residuals.  FSMorder table contains the order of the fault signal apparition for each fault hypothesis; this order is codified 681 
using ordinal numbers, starting with ‘1’. If two fault signals appear at the same time, then they should share the same ordinal 682 
number. Fault signals that are not associated to an fault hypothesis get the code ‘0’ (Meseguer, 2007;2009). The factororder is 683 
calculated comparing the apparition order of the fault signal to the theoretical order stored in the memory. This comparison 684 
34 
 
requires to count the number of apparition order coincidences between the fault signal vector and each jth fault hypothesis 685 
according to: 686 
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 690 
and ,max( )iorder   is the order of apparition in which the ith fault signal has activated with respect to the first activated. Such 691 
order is recorded in the memory component. The factor jorderzvf is defined in a similar way as in the case of 01factor , 692 
excluding those fault hypothesis that do not coincides in the order . 693 
 694 
FSMtime: Evaluation of fault signal appearance time. The element FSMtimeij of matrix FSMtime contains the time interval 695 
[ ij , ij ] in which the fault signal i  caused by fault fj is expected to appear.  This time interval is referred to the occurrence 696 
time instant of the first fault signal according to the fault hypothesis fj as in most of the cases, the fault occurrence time instant 697 
t0 is unknown. (Meseguer et al., 2007) shows that the interval [ ij , ij ] basically depends on the sensitivity of the residual 698 
( )oir k  to fault fj ( ijfS ), on the adaptive threshold [ ( ), ( )]
oo
iir k r k  associated to this residual and on t0. Thus, the elements of 699 
matrix FSMtime are given by 700 
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 702 
From FSMtime matrix, the time window Tw which determines the maximum period of time required once the first fault signal 703 
is observed so that all fault signals can appear can be determined as follows 704 
,
max( )ijw i jT                                                                                        (28) 705 
On the other hand, in order to compare the occurrence time instant of the observed fault signal sequence with the stored one in 706 
matrix FSMtime, the factor factortimej is calculated for every fault hypothesis as it follows: 707 
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where kfi is the apparition time instant of the fault signal i(k), kref is the apparition time instant of the first observed fault 710 
signal,   711 
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and where zvfj is the zero-violation-factor whose expression is  715 
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APPENDIX 2 719 
This appendix presents the contents of the different fault signatures matrices used for the fault isolation module of limnimeters 720 
in the Barcelona sewer network case study. 721 
 722 
FSM01 Matrix 723 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80 
L3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
L8 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
L19 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L27 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
L54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
L56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
L80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 724 
 FSM sign Matrix 725 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80 
L3 +1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L7 0 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 
L8 0 0 +1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L9 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L16 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
L19 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 
 
L27 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 0 0 0 
L54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 -1 0 
L56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 
L80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 +1 
 726 
 727 
 FSM sensit Matrix 728 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80 
L3 0.241 0 0 0 0 0 -0.156 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L7 0 0.115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.033 0 0 0 
L8 0 0 0.360 0 -0.193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L9 0 0 0 0.128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L16 0 0 0 0 0.383 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
L19 0 0 0 0 0 0.033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.379 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.958 0.042 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.254 0.014 0.187 0 0 0 0 
L54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.810 1 -0.393 0 
L56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.080 0 
L80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.580 0 0 0 0.256 
  729 
FSM order Matrix 730 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80 
L3 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
L8 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
L19 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L27 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 
L54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
L56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
L80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 731 
FSMtime Matrix 732 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80 
L3 [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [900,6300] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L7 [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [2100,5400] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L8 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [600,4200] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1]  [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L9 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L16 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [300,2400] 
L19 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L27 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L39 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L41 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [300,3900] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L45 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [300,1800] [0,0] [300,30600] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] 
L54 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [0,0]  [0,0]  [-1,-1] 
L56 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] 
L80 [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [-1,-1] [0,0] 
 733 
APPENDIX  3 734 
37 
 
This appendix presents the averages values of the minimum initial and steady state detectable faults. The intervals correspond 735 
to the evaluation of Eq (18) with  1min ( )kφ H  and  1max ( )kφ H . 736 
 737 
 738 
 739 
 740 
Initial minimum detectable faults  741 
minf f
  with  1( ) |f qS q

  742 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80
RL3 [0.1,0.22] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.45,1] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL7 ∞ [0.06,0.1] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.3,0.5] ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL8 ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.15] ∞ [0.4,0.6] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL9 ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.43] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL16 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.35] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.28,1] 
RL19 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.13] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL27 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.27] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL39 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.57] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL41 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.4,1.2] [0.1,0.32] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL45 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.07,0.7] [0.1,0.92] [0.11,0.97] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL54 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞  [0.35,0.55] [0.1,0.16] [0.42,0.67] ∞ 
RL56 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.39] ∞ 
RL80 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.13,0.46] ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.1,0.36]
 743 
Steady state minimum detectable faults  744 
minf f
  with  1 1( ) |f qS q

  745 
 fL3 fL7 fL8 fL9 fL16 fL19 fL27 fL39 fL41 fL45 fL47 fL53 fL54 fL56 fL80
RL3 [0.4,0.91] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.45,1] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL7 ∞ [0.31,0.5] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.3,0.5] ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL8 ∞ ∞ [0.3,0.45] ∞ [0.41,0.6] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL9 ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.67,2.9] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL16 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.3,1] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.28,1] 
RL19 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [3,30] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL27 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.8,2] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL39 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.4,2.3] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL41 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.4,1.2] [0.6,2.1] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL45 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.07,0.7] [1.1,9.2] [0.11,0.97] ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
RL54 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞  [0.35,0.55] [0.45,0.73] [0.42,0.67] ∞ 
RL56 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [2,7.8] ∞ 
RL80 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.13,0.46] ∞ ∞ ∞ [0.45,1.64]
 746 
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